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1. Leveraging sources of Failure 
In 2014 the intelligence community got the Ukraine wrong. It predicted that Putin would 
not take military action - largely because he would fear international condemnation. 
The moral obloquy of the international community, experts insisted, would cause him 
to hesitate. In short, intelligence analysts in the Western capitals committed the 
familiar error of mirror imaging, thinking about how their own policy makers, with very 
different cultural values and historical legacies, would play out the Ukrainian situation. 
They use their own assumptions and failed to immerse themselves in the cultural 
context of others.  
 
This is a recurrent error. The last time Russian troops arrived in a neighbouring state, 
Western intelligence was also caught out. In 2008, Georgia was the flashpoint and the 
signs were similar, with Moscow issuing visas to ethnic Russians. But Western 
intelligence analysts did not believe that Putin would use force because they were 
again immersed in their own strategic culture and not that of their opponent. Damon 
Wilson, who was then overseeing Europe at the US National Security Council and who 
was also the lead manager at the White House for the Georgia crisis, was open and 
frank about the extent to which the intelligence assessments were off target. “Our 
analysts missed it on Georgia,” he said. Michael Hayden, perhaps America’s most 
distinguished former intelligence chief, has blamed a myopic mindset for these failings. 
He observes: “This is less a question of how many collection resources we throw at 
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Russia and more broadly about the analytic challenge of understanding Putin’s mind 
set.”1 
 
The problem of analysing “mind sets” is an old one. The events in Ukraine and Georgia 
are not entirely dissimilar to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the 
crushing of the Prague Spring, which Western intelligence also missed. In much the 
same way, Denis Greenhill, chair of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee, dismissed 
objective indicators of an impending invasion because he felt that the Russians would 
not stomach the international criticism that would follow hard on the heels of any 
military incursion.2 We now know that cultural expectations repeatedly constrain 
intelligence analysts and endless energy has been expended on trying to persuade 
them to “think outside the box”.  This essay argues that while expectations of behaviour 
derived from our own strategic culture inevitably constrain our own thinking, careful 
attention to the strategic culture of our opponents might be helpful in predicting their 
behaviour, since they are also constrained by a range of historical baggage. In short, 
if as scholars increasingly believe, our opponents are constrained by something which 
Dan Reiter has elegantly termed the “weight of the shadow of the past”, then 
intelligence analysts have perhaps not done enough to leverage this to their 
advantage.3  
 
More recently, other scholars, including Keren Yarhi-Milo, have argued that we do not 
give enough attention to how leaders or their supporting staff think about the long-term 
intentions of adversaries. Again, using a historical case-study approach she suggests 
that we often see the intentions of adversaries through a prism derived from pre-
existing beliefs, theories, and personal impressions, neglecting the professional 
analysis built on hard-won sigint or humint. This is perhaps because the intelligence 
bureaucracies that serve them tend to focus less on intentions and more on changes 
in the military capabilities of adversaries.4   
 
This essay reverses the lens and suggests that we can use the recent explorations of 
culture by historians and social scientists to our advantage in intelligence analysis. 
While no doubt our own pre-existing beliefs and assumptions, whether on the part of  
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our leaders or our analysts, are a weakness, for many of the same reasons, the pre-
existing beliefs of our adversaries are a potential source of strength to us. If we see 
our opponents as mere rational actors then their scope of choice and range of action 
is wide. Once we consider the extent to which they are restricted by a range of norms, 
beliefs and most importantly meta-historical narratives that shape their strategic 
culture, their range of choice is somewhat narrowed. Moreover, the value of giving 
more attention to strategic culture is increased by the fact that fact that it is relatively 
static – to use Reiter’s analogy - the shadow does not move very often or very quickly. 
 
There is a growing conviction that culture matters in international relations, even if we 
are still unsure of how to measure it. Since the 1990s, political science, political 
psychology, international relations and international history have all taken a growing 
interest in culture as a constraining factor for both decision-makers and analysts in the 
realm of international relations. The work is disaggregated and often labels similar 
concepts differently.5 Nevertheless, we have seen a range of fascinating and 
innovative work on strategic culture, the use of historical analogies by decision makers 
and the extent to which senior figures engage in social learning: deriving their 
expectations from a reified notion of the triumphs and tribulations of their own policy 
community in recent decades. To summarise this work - and perhaps to do it some 
violence – all these researchers suggest that policy-makers are creatures of habit and 
those habits are often influenced by recent salient historical experiences that over time 
become collective narratives.6 This process can also operate collectively within 
organizations and is often referred to as “corporate memory”.7  
 
Academics working on intelligence failure like R.K. Betts are famous for their 
pessimism, often arguing that the benefits delivered by new techniques or 
organizational reform are likely to be modest.8 Other are even more gloomy, arguing 
that not only are intelligence analysts prisoners of their own assumptions, but also that 
academics cannot rescue them since they are similarly labouring in the La Brea tar 
pits of pre-conceptions and ‘prior-images’.9 This essay is more optimistic. It suggests 
that there is a wealth of interesting work that we might leverage here to assist with 
strategic estimates and that it is puzzling that we have not tried to harness it before in 
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a more programmatic way. Accordingly, it examines sets of different but related ideas 
about notions of strategic culture, historical analogies and social learning that have 
been developed by range of authors beginning with Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder, 
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May and then asks what they might contribute to 
intelligence analysis. Are ideas about strategic culture and historically shaped mind 
sets helpful tools when trying to think about how our enemy thinks? If historians and 
social scientists are increasingly convinced that strategic culture, corporate memory 
and allied concepts are an important factor in decision making, how might we deploy 
these ideas to improve our intelligence analysis?     
 
Perversely, we may have overlooked the possibility of these ideas because there has 
been so much work on them. Over the last two decades, many different elements 
within the social sciences have attached considerable importance to the way in which 
we use our own recent history as a resource to achieve “policy learning”. Psychologists 
have produced sophisticated work on the way in which we obtain, organize and store 
information in order to develop conceptual frameworks about how the world works. 
Social anthropologists have done much the same thing, but tend to see these 
questions in terms of how cultural norms and group behaviours are created and then 
transmitted down the generations. Historians have also shown huge enthusiasm for 
memory studies over the last decade.10 Moving in much the same spirit, political 
scientists have been especially interested in how communities of policy makers learn, 
allocating a range of terms to this process that range from “organizational learning” 
and “political learning,” to “government learning,” and “social learning”.11 However, 
they have all tended to use different words and ideas to describe the same set of 
related phenomena. 
 
While using different approaches and methodologies, they are nevertheless largely 
engaged in the same exercise and have come to similar conclusions. They are agreed 
that single decision-makers and also groups of decision-makers within government 
bureaucracies deploy collective experience, and especially shared historical 
narratives to assist their comprehension of complex events and to inform their 
response. Because of the breadth of this work and because scholars have tended to 
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utilise divergent concepts and methodologies, the importance of their overall findings 
has perhaps been underestimated by those working in the field of intelligence studies. 
This essay is necessarily brief and therefore focuses on the idea of “strategic culture”, 
using it rather broadly to capture a range of ideas about organizational and social 
learning from recent history and the related process by which policy makers use 
historical analogies and established narratives to frame their decisions.12 
 
As early as 1976, Robert Jervis commented on importance of historical analogy as a 
key process by which policy makers understand challenging situations. Since then we 
have since seen extensive work that suggests that salient events in recent 
international history tend to shape the interpretation of incoming information. Not only 
do previous events offer a range of imaginable situations and causal explanations that 
inform their understanding of the world, they also constrain policy options. This latter 
aspect of constraint seems to offer us some purchase when attempting to forecast 
international events. Observations from strategic culture not only provide us in outline 
with the trajectories that are likely to appeal to leaders instinctively, but also suggest 
those which, while appearing rational in material terms, are nevertheless unappealing 
at a visceral level.13  
 
We need to give more attention to how our growing knowledge about strategic culture 
might be employed by intelligence analysts to avoid misperception. We also need to 
consider which of the many variants of these ideas are best suited to adoption by 
intelligence analysts. Most importantly, we need to ask how intelligence analysts might 
identify how and in what way their target subjects are learning from history in particular 
countries, how this is transformed into collective memory and in which ways they are 
constrained by the resultant strategic culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Snyder, Booth and the idea of Strategic Culture 
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Culture is rightly viewed as a slippery concept.14 Nevertheless, the notion of strategic 
culture now commands wide consensus, and if the behaviour of states is significantly 
shaped by strategic culture, then this is a potential source of insight into likely future 
courses of action.  Some of the first systematic explorations of strategic culture were 
offered by Jack Snyder in 1977. In attempting to understand how Moscow thought 
about nuclear weapons, he suggested that we might consider how the total sum of 
ideas, conditioned behaviours and historic patterns of thought affected a national 
strategic community. Here he was reacting to the rational choice assumptions of game 
theorists. The implication was that a nation’s sense of its own politico-military 
experience over time was also important. For Snyder, strategic culture also conjured 
up the dangers of ethnocentrism - a feeling of ‘group centrality and superiority’ that 
contributed to a lack of intellectual challenge and which could potentially result in 
constraint within one’s own narrow military culture.15  
 
Snyder argued that the Soviet military exhibited a preference for the pre-emptive or 
offensive use of force and the origins for this could be found rooted in a Russian history 
of insecurity and authoritarian control. Moreover, he argued that because of the 
sources of strategic culture were about the way in which history was socialized into a 
distinctive mode of strategic thinking, then it was reasonable to assume that strategic 
culture was semi-permanent, or at least changed only slowly. Despite these intriguing 
ruminations, Snyder eventually came to cast doubt on the value of cultural 
explanations, insisting that cause and effect were so distant that it would be difficult 
for political scientists to demonstrate any linkage in a rigorous way.16  
 
Ken Booth was less anxious about deploying strategic culture.17 In a classic 
monograph penned in 1979, he related both strategic culture and ethnocentrism to the 
problem of “groupthink” with its subliminal tendencies towards bureaucratic 
consensus. He argued that while ethnocentrism does not automatically lead to 
groupthink, it increases the likelihood that groupthink will occur, with the desire for 
consensus overriding realistic appraisals of alternative ideas and courses of action.18 
In other words, he suggested that culture can act as a constraining factor. Booth 
asserts that ethnocentrism and groupthink work in tandem to produce stereotyped 
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images of the 'outgroups' and a tendency for collective judgements to be self-
confirming and therefore riskier than would otherwise be the case.19  Intriguingly, 
although much of what Booth argued had an obvious importance for intelligence 
analysis and strategic assessments, the thrust of the debate over strategic culture in 
international security has ignored its value to intelligence analysis and has instead 
focused on action and reaction cycles.20 Equally, Colin Gray describes strategic 
culture as modes of thought that relate to behavioural patterns with respect to the use 
of force which derive from national historical experience, but without any comment on 
the utility of this in forecasting.21 Instead, these notions have become caught up in a 
complex methodological debate about how far it is possible to use the concept 
rigorously in the world of academe, rather than in generating national estimates.22  
 
Booth was actually deploying the notion of intelligence and culture in two senses, one 
of them specific and one of them more general. In the specific sense, some of these 
issues about the impact of culture upon perception had already been raised by other 
researchers alongside Robert Jervis.23 Indeed, as early as 1973, Antony Marc Lewis, 
who had run a foreign area studies programme within the CIA, argued that internal 
Vietnam War case-studies showed conclusively that ‘hidden cultural assumptions 
crippled the CIA’s ability to perform its advisory functions’.24 Over the next decade, the 
revered area studies specialist Adda Bozeman became an evangelist for ‘cultural 
understanding’ as a prerequisite for both improved net assessment and for strategic 
thinking.25 Bozeman also argued that shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of 
behaviour, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives and historical 
traditions influence collective decisions in the security realm.26 Since then, numerous 
in-service training programmes for intelligence analysts have sought to address the 
problem of our own cultural confinement and established assumptions amongst 
analysts.27 The importance of cultural awareness and “tribal” intelligence has also 
been periodically rediscovered in the context of counter-insurgency, although 
academic anthropologists are understandably unnerved by the eager embrace of the 
intelligence community.28 
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More importantly, Booth was also using the idea of strategic culture in a general sense 
to capture the idea of a world-view. What we might call a fundamental cognitive 
orientation. Culture certainly constrains how intelligence institutions relate to a 
globalising world, what tasks they should perform and what we think intelligence might 
be, but it also constrains our opponents and their range of action.29 In this wider sense, 
we are all potentially prisoners of the ethnocentric dungeon. Moreover, while there is 
an emerging consensus that we need to take account of culture in the study of national 
security policy, it has not yet impacted upon realm of national intelligence 
communities.30 Philip Davies is one of the few academics who have deployed the idea 
of culture in the context of intelligence, comparing the British and American analytic 
systems.31 Arguably, the idea of culture has the potential to take us further in the realm 
of intelligence, explaining the role of institutionalised norms and values that countries 
associate with their intelligence communities, together with their place in the national 
psyche.32 Escaping the cycle of pessimism, can we perhaps become conscious and 
strategic users of strategic culture to achieve our intelligence goals.33 
 
Admittedly, there are problems with some of the early ideas around strategic culture. 
Although their claims were modest, suggesting only that strategic culture tends to 
inform certain strategic behaviours, or that strategy is only partly produced by culture, 
it remains hard to tell which parts of decision-making are most effected by strategic 
cultural factors. Nor do they explain why particular modes of strategic behaviour are 
more salient at particular moments. There was little attempt to consider how strategic 
culture transmitted over time, between different sections of government, and whether 
it changed appreciably through transmission.34 Meanwhile, in the 1980s other 
researchers working in cognate areas, but not necessarily describing their research 
as an investigation into “strategic culture”, were nevertheless working on these 
problems and connecting them to other ideas about learning from history.  
 
 
 
2.Richard Neustadt and Ernest May 
Even while the first debates on strategic culture were developing, two Harvard 
scholars, Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, had begun to run courses on the uses of 
Strategic Culture as a Constraint 
 
10 
 
history for decision-makers. Neustadt and May were not expressly researching 
strategic culture, but they were nevertheless rather interested in the impact of 
socialized historical analogies on decision-making and the way in which government 
communities used these events as symbols. Both had personal experience of policy, 
having served in different parts of the government at an earlier stage of their careers: 
Neustadt for John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson and May for the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. Their famous book that captured insights from their activities – Thinking in Time 
- contains a number of discussions on intelligence (and indeed covert action) but has 
been rather neglected by intelligence studies specialists.35 
 
Neustadt and May made significant claims. They asserted that policy-makers use 
history as a tool - but use it badly. They are constrained rather than liberated by it, 
tending to use lazy analogies drawn from a vernacular history that is based on 
assumptions and received wisdom. As such history misleads policy-makers by 
creating a number of fixed reference points. Nevertheless, Neustadt and May were 
optimists and asserted that, if deployed correctly, history can serve as a powerful 
analytical tool for government officials. They accepted that history can both inform and 
mislead those seeking to create assessments of current events. But they were also 
confident that it could reveal a complex matrix of events and their causes seen within 
the frame of their societal context as part of a process of understanding the personal 
approaches of individuals and the recent histories of particular organizations.36 
 
Their principle source of anxiety was that officials seemed to know little about the 
cultural and historical context of the events they were engaged with. As a result they 
tended to draw incorrect lessons from history by using incomplete or inappropriate 
analogies that were often simplistic. Their case studies were based on recent issues 
in government affairs including the Korean War, the Americanization of the Vietnam 
War in 1965, the Bay of Pigs, the Mayaguez incident, and the Anglo-American Skybolt 
missile controversy. They used these case studies to identify several pathologies 
including an overdependence on “fuzzy analogies" both for intelligence analysis and 
for policy advocacy. This was linked to a lack of attention to the historical evolution of 
the issue in the past and stereotyped suppositions about the foreign decision makers 
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involved. Some of these observations had already been identified by Irving Janis in 
her important 1972 study of “Groupthink”.37  
 
Their most important prescription was locating issues, individuals, and organizations 
in their proper historical and geographical context. They argued that events should be 
inspected and seen within a stream of time. This should sharpen the decision maker's 
appreciation of continuities and changes. Furthermore, since the future emerges from 
the past, this process allows decision-makers to employ the predictive value of the 
past in shaping the future. The arguments that Neustadt and May made for this mildly 
predictive aspect of history have been overlooked. The exercise of culturally and 
historical locating the opponent seeks to increase an understanding of how key actors 
are likely to view the issue and how this constrains them. To accomplish this, a 
decision maker should take into account factors such as generation, significant life 
events, gender and race.38 
 
Neustadt and May's most compelling example of the way in which the United States 
deployed a strategic culture informed by the recent past was set out in their analysis 
of Lyndon B. Johnson and the expansion of the war in Vietnam. When his security 
advisers considered committing American ground forces they “did so with faith 
buttressed by remembered victories", after all the United States had always won when 
deploying significant military power. Recent limited wars, for example Korea, had 
resulted in the opponent negotiating for peace. "Affinities for the remembered past 
gave certain options added weight and at the same time tended to exclude others”.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Dan Reiter and policy learning 
 
Throughout the 1990s, ideas of strategic culture and how they might be applied to 
international relations were refined by Alastair Iain Johnston and Colin Gray. This 
resulted in a complex debate about just how far these ideas could be operationalized 
by political scientists or modelled using numbers.40 Moving in parallel to this debate 
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were other efforts to draw on social psychology and learning theory which seemed to 
offer an alternative conceptual framework to traditional realism. Whereas realism 
proposed that states mostly behave in response to changes in the level of external 
threat, those drawing on learning theory suggested that states make policy congruent 
with lessons drawn from important historical experiences that linger in the memory. In 
contrast to Neustadt and May, who used anecdotal and discursive evidence, 
researchers like Dan Reiter used more formal small-N comparison to compare the 
predictions of realism and learning theory, using as his case study its ability to forecast 
the alliance choices of minor powers. Reiter showed that learning from history and the 
use of analogies by decision-makers was the dominant factor in explaining alliance 
choices by states, while power, represented here by variations in the degree of 
external threat, was a less important factor.41 
 
Reiter argued that social psychology and organization theory allows us to create a 
general theory of learning from the past in international politics. His underlying 
question was really the broader problem of how decision-makers cope with 
uncertainty. One common response by decision makers, he asserts, is to draw lessons 
from past experiences to address difficult choices. Psychologists talk about this in 
terms of knowledge structures, or “schemata”, which provide mental frameworks within 
which data are organized for storage and retrieval. These schemata lend structure to 
experience, determine what information will be encoded or retrieved from memory, 
affect the speed of cognition, and facilitate problem solving. Management scientists 
working on organization theory deploy a similar concept called “analogical reasoning”. 
Here, an individual uses analogies to draw parallels with past events to illuminate new 
problems and challenges. Organization theorists have placed more emphasis on the 
idea of learning, suggesting that organizational behaviour is ultimately “history 
dependent”. Some have suggested that organizations are most likely to change old 
ways of thinking and behaving after serious failures, while success promotes 
complacency and convergence. Both perspectives suggest that unless there is a major 
failure, historically constructed beliefs tend to persists, and established policies 
become semi-permanent, despite the reception of new information that might sit 
awkwardly with received wisdom. This is because organizations tend to grow collective 
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interpretations of history that become widely accepted.42 Those in organisation studies 
were moving in parallel with researchers into strategic culture who also suggest that 
these phenomena are semi-permanent or at least slow to change.43 
 
  
 
4.Yuen Foong Khong and war by analogy 
 
Many of the findings of Reiter’s work were echoed by contemporaneous work by Yuen 
Foong Khong. In his book Analogies at War he showed how analogies are used by 
decision makers to “help” define the nature of the problem. The way in which policy-
makers do this tends to highlight the similarities between historical narratives while 
downplaying their differences. Khong argues that new events tend to be assimilated 
into pre-existing structures in the mind because of the limited cognitive capacities of 
human beings. Again, this approach borrows from the work of psychologists, deploying 
the idea that a schema is a generic concept stored in memory and may refer to objects, 
situations, events, or sequences of events and people.44 
 
It is clear that analogies are often misused by decision-makers. Like Neustadt and 
May, Khong is fascinated by Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1965 decision to escalate US 
involvement in Vietnam. He uses this episode to show that one notable problem with 
analogies is their persistence, even when they are shown to be erroneous. Precisely 
because analogies are not precise and have more the status of myths and stories, 
they are malleable and need not fit in every detail. Therefore, decision-makers can 
dismiss evidence against the analogy as being a one-off occurrence and still cling to 
their false analogy. Senior policy-makers are sometimes inclined to construct facts to 
fit their analogy, instead of seeking an analogy that fits the facts. Ease of recall is vital 
to adhesion within a policy community, hence more recent situations with more 
superficial similarities to the present case are most often invoked.45 
 
All the above authors and commentators seem persuaded that historical events and 
experiences, together with the 'lessons' and analogies which policy makers draw from 
them, exert an important impact upon policy thinking and behaviour. Many of their 
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findings derive from cognitive psychology, from which a wide range of scholars of 
foreign policy analysis have borrowed from significantly since 1990. Cognitive 
psychologists consider the tendency to analogize to be an activity common to all 
human beings, and a process which is necessary in order to make sense of the world 
around us. Confronted with bewildering complexity and structural uncertainty, we need 
cognitive 'short cuts' which allow us to process information efficiently. It is only natural 
that large volumes of new information must be matched to existing categories, 
schemas and familiar narratives. It is a basic human instinct to try to learn from our 
own memories and to ask the question: 'Have I seen this before - and what did I learn 
from similar experiences last time?' 
 
Rather alarming evidence suggest that policy-makers are strongly influenced by 
narratives and stories even when they are fictional. Popular culture and especially 
television series and films that focus on national security can quickly become signifiers 
and short-hand in debates amongst policy-makers about future action.  We know that 
film and television drama is often used in political discourse and “24”, the popular 
counterterrorism drama made in the years after 9/11 has fulfilled this role over the last 
decade. The series “24” is not only a frequent reference point in major daily 
newspapers, it has also been used as a short-hand in government to indicate  different 
options and preferences in counter-terrorism. In other words, fictional narratives can 
also operate as powerful analogies, in the same way that real historical narratives 
operate in political discourse. Intelligence analysts need to be sensitive not only to the 
major historical reference points that influence foreign leaders, but also their favourite 
navigation points in terms of popular culture.46 
 
 
 
5. Can we usefully use strategic culture in analysis? 
 
 
Policy-makers, even more than normal human beings, live in a complex world, but 
only have a limited amount of time to analyse the events around them. Moreover, 
under time pressure, there are only a finite number of words to communicate their 
ideas and options. Historical analogies, even narratives derived from popular culture, 
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provide useful mental and verbal shortcuts – functioning as symbols perhaps. 
Moreover, as humans, we also deploy stories to legitimate our activities. Accordingly, 
during a crisis, intelligence analysts could do worse than ask what stories our 
opponents are using to frame current events. We also need to ask, are we aware of 
all of the significant “baggage” that comes with each analogy in terms of resulting 
action or inaction? 
 
The advantage of looking at strategic culture is that it is fairly stable and for the most 
part shifts slowly. Only catastrophic failure triggers major shifts in these policy 
navigation points. This is because it is related to long-term conceptions of a country’s 
own history and identity. This strategic continuity is further reinforced by the inertia 
and self-interest of bureaucracies. So forecasters might well start with the assumption 
that the future range of options that are considered, and those quickly dismissed, is 
often similar to past events of the same type, even if they are decades apart. Recent 
research suggest that this is especially true where leaders perceive past policy 
success in events of the same type within living memory. Admittedly strategic culture 
is more about constraint and paths not taken, in other words it is most useful in telling 
us what our opponent will not do, or is unlikely to do, because they are bound by the 
foreign policy traditions and received wisdoms of the country in question. 
Nevertheless, closer attention to strategic culture should also allow intelligence 
analysts to reject the notion that states will just behave as rational actors and choose 
the most efficient strategy. More importantly, thinking about strategic culture will also 
help us to reject the assumption our opponents will behave much like us, a mistake 
that we seem to have made with both Georgia and the Ukraine.47 
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